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In February 2011, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute released a study by Scott Newark, entitled, 
“Why Canadian crime statistics do not add up: not the whole truth”.
This report ignited an angry and sustained response from criminologists condemning the 
analysis.  Professor Hackler  (University of Victoria) said, “The Mcdonald-Laurier Institute is 
showing its political bias as it provides false information to support Harper’s misinformed ‘get 
tough on crime’ strategy that seems to be popular with voters who like simple-minded solu-
tions to complex problems”.  Professor Doob (University of Toronto) stated that the report 
“suggests that violent crime is increasing, contrary to the Statscan report and all reasoned 
examinations of existing data”.  
Professor Boyd (Simon Fraser University) said, “This is a highly politicized document that 
isn’t paying attention to relevant data.”  Professor Boyd also said, “It’s really badly done. It’s 
embarrassing, actually”. Professor Hackler said the study illustrated “ideological bias.” (letter, 
Globe and Mail).   “Criminologists say the study …is “highly politicized” and without statisti-
cal merit” (Canadian Press).
The vitriolic reaction revealed a remarkable homogeneity and singular conformity amongst 
criminologists. Normally, public policy debates span the ideological spectrum in the policy, 
political science and economics communities in vigorously debating values, foundational 
principles and the greater public good that any public policy is attempting to address. More-
over, policy debates normally encourage – not discourage - the involvement of the public.
Yet, the monochromatic reaction by criminologists to Newark and the Government of Canada 
crime policies was exactly the opposite. There was no evident debate amongst criminologists 
concerning significant public support for these policies, other than to continually dismiss the 
views of large numbers of Canadians as “perceptions”. There was no reference to the Treasury 
Board budgetary estimates or the Correctional Service of Canada annual forecast (RPP) or ac-
tual departmental report on spending (DPR) or the Public Safety RPP or DPR or the Auditor 
General’s Report or Justice Canada’s analysis of the cost of crime. The reaction was a paternal-
istic rejection of any questioning of the “received wisdom” (John Kenneth Galbraith), instead 
of engaging in an open policy debate with Canadians.
Critics repeatedly suggested or inferred that these tough on crime policies are based on spu-
rious violent crime statistics and have resulted in serious over-incarceration in Canada and 
exploding costs to the Government of Canada and thus the citizens as taxpayers.
The author of this document has worked independently and is solely responsible for the views presented here. The opinions are not necessarily those of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute for Public Policy, its Directors or Supporters.
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2Democracy and policy debates are messy and chaotic.  As Bismarck noted, those who like 
politics and sausage, should not watch it being made.  However, the monolithic attempt by 
criminologists to restrict debate to their own community reveals that just as war is too im-
portant to be left to the generals, public policies concerning crime and punishment are far 
too important to be left to the criminologists.  The debate requires cross fertilization from 
those actually involved in the criminal justice system such as victims, police, crown attorneys, 
judges, correctional officers, as well as Canadians from all walks of life – who bear the burden 
of our crime policies, create societal wealth and pay the taxes.   
In this brief empirical analysis, based on testimony presented to the House of Commons Pub-
lic Safety Committee on March 3, 2011, I will address three hotly debated public policy issues 
in the Parliament of Canada and the public discourse during the last three years.
1.  Is violent crime increasing or decreasing in Canada and on whom and where in Canada 
does it fall?
2.   Does Canada incarcerate large numbers of offenders as is often claimed and “large” relative 
to what benchmark – total number of crimes committed or the Canadian population or some 
other country?
3.  Is Canada spending large and increasing amounts of public funds on incarceration and 
“large” relative to what benchmarks – total federal spending or some other benchmark?
Empirical evidence will be presented that is drawn from the Canada Department of Public 
Safety Departmental Performance Report (DPR) and Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP); 
Correctional Service of Canada DPR and RPP; Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Main Esti-
mates and TBS Canada’s Performance Report; Statistics Canada Juristats; Parliamentary Bud-
get Office “Funding Requirement and impact of “Truth in Sentencing” on the Correctional sys-
tem in Canada”; Office of the Auditor General, 2009, Chapter 7—Economy and Efficiency of 
Services—Correctional Service Canada; House of Commons Public Safety Committee tran-
scripts of witness testimony; Public Works and Government Services Canada DPR and RPP; 
the OECD 2010 Factbook and OECD Society at a Glance, 2009; and Justice Canada’s “Costs of 
Crime in Canada 2008”.
1.  Violent Crime is down in Canada?
Societies and people change very slowly in any nation.  While Canadian criminologists ana-
lyze only the last 10 years of Statistics Canada data – which reflect a decline in violent crime in 
Canada - the last 10 years do not capture the enormous changes that have occurred in Cana-
dian society from the 1960s to the present. 
The period from the 1960s to the present approximately correspond to the emergence of 
the baby boom generation as children in the 1960s. The period from the mid 1960s to the 
new millennium – approximately a third of a century - witnessed greater transformations 
and changes in individual and societal values than at any other time in history.  This period 
witnessed the rise of the youth movement and rebellion (“never trust anyone over 30”), the 
decline in traditional religion as an organizing principle of social life, the breakdown of the 
traditional family, the emergence of alternative life styles, emergence of the women’s move-
ment, significant increases in divorce to name but a few.  One very clear outcome was a decline 
3in the homogeneity (and conformity) of the Canadian population, which until the late 1960s 
was British and “anglo-saxon”. 
The author vividly remembers public schools in the 1960s displaying a picture of the Queen in 
a prominent place near the school entrance.  Moreover, students were required to sing “God 
Save the Queen” every morning before classes started in 1960 through 1966 (memories of the 
author).  This practice ended when then Ontario Conservative Education Minister Bill Davis 
closed rural schools and bused rural students to regional schools being built.  “God Save the 
Queen” was replaced with the Canadian national anthem.  And schools during this period still 
administered the strap to wayward, unruly boys (including the author of this report).  How-
ever, Ritalin was not prescribed to drug rambunctious boys.   
Some social scientists such as Hannah Arendt characterized these changes as the “decline of 
authority” while others characterized this period as a decline in social cohesion and social 
solidarity, captured evocatively by political science Professor Putnam in his phrase, “bowling 
alone”.
Notwithstanding these well known transformations and changes in the body politic in Cana-
dian society, criminologists mostly only analyze crime statistics from the last 10 years.   Yet, 
these (mostly positive) enormous societal and individual changes engendered a decline in 
social cohesion and social solidarity, which is reflected inter alia, in the crime statistics (see 
OECD Society at a Glance, 2009 which categorizes incarceration rates under “social cohesion” 
heading).  It is for these reasons, that I will use Statistics Canada empirical data concerning 
violent crime back to 1962. 
Statistics Canada commenced the recording of police-reported crime statistics in 1962.  An 
examination of the Statistics Canada table on Page 19 record that 221 violent crimes per 
100,000 were reported in 1962.  This figure increased year by year, doubling by 1970 to 480 per 
100,000, increasing again to 636 per 100,000 by 1980 and finally peaking at 1084 per 100,000 
by 1992– a 500% increase in 30 years or a third of a century.  See the Table on Page 19 of this 
document.
However, the changes in police-reported violent crime from 1962 to the present probably do 
not fully capture the extent of the problem.  Statistics Canada General Social Survey (2005), 
although reporting on a later period, found that only 34% of crimes are reported to the police. 
For example, the percentages of the violent crimes not reported include:
- 92% of sexual assaults not reported
- 61% of physical assaults not reported
- 46% of break-ins not reported
- 54% of robberies not reported
As will be discussed in the conclusion, this data suggests that a significant number of Canadi-
ans possess lived, first-hand experience with crime, given that the 2.5 million crimes reported 
to police do not adequately capture the actual number of crimes committed.   
4There is yet another issue that has not been adequately reported or fully understood in the po-
litical and public discourse.  The incidence of reported crime is significantly higher in western 
Canada and the northern territories.  These statistics perhaps provide insights concerning the 
regional nature of political and citizen demands to respond to crime.
Regional Distribution of Crime, 2008
Source: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/2009-ccrso-eng.aspx
The statistics reported in the table above, are reflected and confirmed in the Statistics Canada 
Crime Severity Index by Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), illuminate the challenges in ad-
dressing crime in western cities including Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Edmonton, Kelowna, 
Abbotsford and Vancouver.
Of equal importance, are the relatively much lower levels in the Crime Severity Index, expe-
rienced by Ottawa, Toronto, Barrie, Kingston, Peterborough, Guelph and Windsor.  These 
statistics lend credence to the old adage that “where you stand depends on where you sit”. 
Restated, the lower levels of crime experienced by some citizens from Ontario and Quebec, 
possibly provides additional illumination of hostility to “tough on crime” policies.
   
5Crime Severity Index by CMA, 2009
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2010002/article/11292-eng.htm#a3
2.  Canada imprisons large numbers of people?
The “crime funnel” in the next graph reveals that although almost 2.5 million crimes were 
committed in Canada in 2009, only 10% (242,988) were convicted and approximately 25% 
of those convicted were sentenced to provincial prisons, while only 4,825 were sentenced to 
federal penitentiaries.  Restated, the flow of prisoners to federal corrections facilities was less 
than 5,000 for the entire year for the entire country.  This is not a large number by the standard 
of a reasonable person.
6Extraordinarily low ratio of federal incarceration relative to crimes committed, 2009
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/_fl/2009-ccrso-eng.pdf
The graph below,demonstrates that the approximately 4,800 people sentenced to federal peni-
tentiary, is fairly stable over the past 10 years.  These numbers are equivalent to a small town 
in Canada.  Restated, a reasonable person would not conclude that 4,800 is a large number 
relative to the population of Canada.
Admissions to CSC, 1999-2009
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/_fl/2009-ccrso-eng.pdf
7The relatively small annual number of admissions annually to federal penitentiaries in Cana-
da, suggest a relatively small federal inmate population. 
Examination of the following table reveals that the average number incarcerated in Canada’s 
federal penitentiaries is less than 14,000 people.  This is a very small number relative to Cana-
da’s population of 34 million people.
Incarcerated Federal Offenders, 1999-2008
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/_fl/2009-ccrso-eng.pdf
The data in the previous table is validated in the Parliamentary Budget Office table below. 
While this report focuses only on federal corrections in Canada, it should be noted that the 
PBO confirmed similar relatively small numbers for all provinces and territories in reporting 
the “average inmate head count” at 23,025.
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Source: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/sites/pbo-dpb/documents/TISA_C-25.pdf
It is critical to an understanding of federal penal policy to analyze the composition of Canada’s 
federal prison population, to determine the rationale for incarceration, because there are alle-
gations that Canada is over-incarcerating or incarcerating substantial numbers of non-violent 
persons.  
Upon examination, it is determined that these allegations are empirically inaccurate.  The 
graph below reveals that 69% - or almost 3 of every 4 federally incarcerated offenders – are 
imprisoned for violent crimes against people, including first degree and second degree mur-
der, sexual assaults, assault, kidnapping, arson.  Only 30% of federal inmates are incarcerated 
in federal prisons for non-violent offenses.
For example,
- 26% of federal offenders are sentenced for homicide
- 18% of federal offenders are sentenced for sex offences
- 15% of male federal offenders have gang associations
- 27% of female federal offenders are sentenced for homicide, 23% for robbery, 26% for 
drugs
Source:  The Changing Federal Offender Population, 2009, Correctional Service of Canada: http://www.csc-scc.
gc.ca/text/rsrch/special_reports/sr2009/sr-2009-eng.shtml
9The composition of federal offenders with 69% sentenced for violent crime reveals that penal 
policy in Canada is empirically different from US policy, for not only are incarceration rates 
vastly lower (116 vs 756 per 100,000), but the composition is different for the US incarcerates 
large numbers for property crimes.  
For those not yet convinced by the empirical data in comparison as a percentage of the Cana-
dian population, or in comparison with our southern neighbor, we now examine comparative 
rates of incarceration internationally. 
Below, the Department of Public Safety appears to have used an international list that “cherry 
picked” certain countries.   The department’s list shows that Canada is at the higher end of 
incarceration rates relative to select European countries.  See the graph immediately below.
However, it is misleading to “cherry pick” certain countries.  When undertaking comparative 
international research, it is normal and best practice, to identify the relevant OECD dataset, 
for the OECD is the gold standard of international comparative research, as it does not use 
selectivity as the foundation of its methodology.
Indeed, when we examine the 2010 OECD Factbook, the OECD Comparative Prison Popula-
tion, reveals that Canada is below the OECD average.  Moreover, the data reveals that similar 
common law countries such as the United Kingdom are incarcerating people at a substantially 
higher rate than Canada while Australia, New Zealand and the USA are higher than Canada 
as well. 



























186 96 ... 282 68 1,672 170 ... 1,842
Prince Edward 
Island
71 16 5 92 83 702 21 ... 723
Nova Scotia 180 240 29 449 59 .. .. ... ...
New 
Brunswick
278 133 20 431 71 2,047 363 ... 2,410
Quebec 2,466 2,021 .. 4,486 72 9,198 3,408 479 13,085
Ontario 2,802 5,809 244 8,855 87 53,354 3,76 217 57,327
Manitoba 510 1,133 .. 1,642 177 5,426 798 ... 6,224
Saskatchewan 869 573 11 1,453 187 3,848 1,312 ... 5,159
Alberta 1,089 1,796 .. 2,885 104 8,689 1,375 ... 10,063
British
Columbia
1,234 1,546 30 2,809 80 13,002 2,249 ... 15,251
Yukon 31 .. 48 79 303 245 29 ... 275
Northwest
Territories
171 92 1 264 843 415 26 ... 441




9,964 13,507 387 23,858 90 98,596 13,506 696 112,798
Federal 13,343 ... ... 13,343 51 ... ... ... 7,166
Total 23,307 13,507 387 37,201 141 98,596 13,506 696 119,965
.. not available for a specific reference period / ... not applicable
Source:  Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Key Indicator Report for Audits
OECD Comparative Prison Population Rate per 100,000, 2009
OECD Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/822712761682 




However, it is only when we examine the breakdown of Canadian federal versus provincial in-
carceration rates, that we understand the degree to which Canada “under incarcerates”.  As the 
Statistics Canada table reveals, the Government of Canada not only incarcerates well below 
the USA, UK, Australia and NZ, but it is below the OECD average and indeed is below every 
European country, for the Canadian federal rate of 51 per 100,000 is below Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway. 
3.  Federal Corrections Budget is large and out of control?
The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) is an agency that is part of the Public Safety port-
folio and a sector within the Government of Canada.   Its mandate is:
Source: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/organi-eng.shtml
The CSC budget in 2010-11 was just under $2.5 billion.  During the past 2-3 years, a significant 
number of criminologists, NGOs and journalists expressed increasingly grave concern over 
the proposed “law and order” bills introduced by the Government of Canada.  Indeed, there 
have been many allegations that spending on federal corrections is spiralling out of control.
However, an examination of actual Government of Canada budget documents tabled in Par-
liament reveals the Government of Canada spends $260 billion annually.  Thus, CSC which 
spends $2.5 billion represents 1% of the total annual Government of Canada expenditures.
Overview of Government of Canada Planned Spending, 2010-11
The overview below provides the “big picture” of Government of Canada expenditures.  Se-




Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) contributes to public safety by administering 
court-imposed sentences for offenders sentenced to two years or more.  This involves 
managing institutions of various security levels and supervising offenders on different 
forms of conditional release whicl assisting them to become law-abiding citizens.  CSC 
also adminsters post-sentence supervision of offenders with Long Term Supervision 
Orders for up to ten years.
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Source: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/20102011/p2-eng.asp
The table below provides a breakdown of this sector, Security and Public Safety, which inter 
alia, lists the annual budget of CSC.
Source: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/20102011/p2-eng.asp
Table 12:  Security and Public Safety Programs
Change
2010-11 2009-10 $ %
(thousands)
Royal Canadian Mounted Police 2,813,950 2,647,206 166,744 6.3
Correctional Service 2,460,249 2,204,517 255,733 11.6
Canadian Border Services Agency 1,619,390 1,483,029 136,361 9.2
Canadian Security Intelligence Service 506,573 496,357 10,215 2.1
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness 440,729 422,086 18,643 4.4
National Parole Board 46,407 46,178 229 0.5
Royal Canadian Mounted Police Public
  Complaints Commission 5,388 5,181 207 4.0
Office of the Correctional Investigator 3,557 3,176 381 12.0
Security Intelligence Review Committee 2,996 2,926 70 2.4
Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
  External Review Committee 1,811 1,074 737 68.6
Total 7,901,049 7,311,730 589,319 8.1
Table 6  Net Budgetary Expenditures by Sector
Change % of
2010-11 2009-10 $ % Total
(thousands)
Sectors
  Social programs (1) 118,244,728 106,494,160 11,750,568 11.0 45.3
  General government services (2) 34,688,202 35,107,027 (418,825) (1.2) 13.3
  International, immigration and defence programs 29,369,960 26,739,370 2,630,590 9.8 11.2
  Industrial, regional, and scientific-technological
    support programs 15,702,871 9,164,547 6,538,324 71.3 6.0
  Environmental and resource-based programs 11,481,416 9,837,816 1,643,600 16.7 4.4
  Security and public safety programs 7,901,049 7,311,730 589,319 8.1 3.0
  Cultural programs 3,976,576 3,790,124 186,451 4.9 1.5
  Transportation programs 2,917,460 2,307,776 609,685 26.4 1.1
  Justice and legal programs 1,461,160 1,415,698 45,462 3.2 0.6
  Parliament and Governor General 603,284 584,312 18,971 3.2 0.2
Sub-total sectors 226,346,706 202,752,907 23,593,798 11.6 86.6
Other items not allocated to a specific sector
  Public debt charges 33,693,000 31,868,000 1,825,000 5.7 12.9
  Employment insurance adminstration (3) 1,195,163 1,164,038 31,125 2.7 0.5
Sub-total other items 34,888,163 33,032,038 1,856,125 5.6 13.4
Total net budgetary expenditures 261,234,868 235,784,945 25,449,924 10.8 100.0
Note:  Totals may not add due to rounding
1.  Includes transfer payments for Employment Insurance, Elderly Benefits, the Canada Health Transfer and the Canada Social Transfer
2.  Includes transfer payments to territorial governments and equalization payments.
3.  This represents administrative charges associated with the provision of the Employment Insurance Plan
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In 2011-12, the Government of Canada is increasing the annual budget of CSC by $500 mil-
lion, a 21% increase.
Source: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/20112012/me-bpd/docs/me-bpd-eng.pdf
The increase in CSC budget from $2.5 billion to $3 billion will raise CSC’s share of total Gov-
ernment of Canada spending to 1.2% of total annual federal expenditures.
In turn, the Government of Canada annual expenditure budget of $250 billion in 2011-12 is 
approximately 17% of the GDP of Canada ($1.5 trillion).
The CSC Budget of $3 billion in 2011-12 represents approximately 1.2 cents of every tax dollar.
Total Cost of Criminal Justice System
Justice Canada estimates that the total cost of the criminal justice system across Canada is ap-
proximately $15.0 billion annually. (Source: http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/rs/rep-rap/2011/
rr10_5/index.html)
The $15 billion annual cost of the criminal justice system represents 2.5% of total expenditures 
by all governments across Canada as follows: 
- Policing services: 57.2%
- Corrections: 32.2%
- Courts: 4.5%
- Prosecution: 3.5%  
- Legal Aid: 2.5% 
The entire cost of the criminal justice system for the federal, all provincial and territorial gov-
ernments, for police, courts, prosecution and corrections, is 2.5% of total government expen-
ditures.  This is a very small percentage to protect Canadians and ensure the rule of law.
Security and Public Safety Program
Change
2011-12 2010-11 $ %
(thousands of dollars)
Departments and agencies
  Correctional Service 2,981,857 2,460,249 521,608 21.2
  Royal Canadian Mounted Police 2,882,990 2,813,950 69,040 2.5
  Canada Border Services Agency 1,846,456 1,619,390 227,066 14.0
  Canadian Security Intelligence Service 509,033 506,573 2,460 0.5
  Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness 414,637 440,729 (26,092) (5.9)
  National Parole Board 49,235 46,407 2,828 6.1
  Royal Canadian Mounted Police Public
    Complaints Commission 5,412 5,388 24 0.4
  Office of the Correctional Investigator 4,318 3,557 761 21.4
  Security Intelligence Review Committee 3,014 2,996 18 0.6
  Royal Canadian Mounted Police External
  Review Committee 1,469 1,811 (342) (18.9)
Total 8,698,421 7,901,049 797,372 10.1
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Federal Penitentiaries
According to the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) (Funding Requirement 
and Impact of “Truth in Sentencing Act” on the Correctional System in Canada: http://www2.
parl.gc.ca/sites/pbo-dpb/documents/TISA_C-25.pdf), there are 74 CSC penitentiaries across 
Canada.  Unfortunately, there is little public data to estimate the replacement costs or new 
constructions costs.  While there are public estimates available in the US, there are serious 
incomparability problems.
However, in PBO testimony before the House of Commons Public Safety Committee in Feb-
ruary 2011, it was revealed that it is estimated to cost $240 million to build a medium or 
maximum security prison.
According to the CSC DPR, the Capital Budget is $230.8 million for 2010-2011.
Yet no major new federal prison has been built since 1988 at Port Cartier, Quebec, while 28 
federal prisons are over 40 years old (Source: CSC Review Panel: A roadmap to strengthen-
ing public safety, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/csc-scc/cscrprprt-eng.pdf).  About 40-50 years 
is considered a reasonable lifecycle for a prison.  Indeed, there are several very old, obsolete 
federal penitentiaries in Canada still in use:
- Kingston Penitentiary, Ontario built 1835
- Stony Mountain, Manitoba built 1876
- Dorchester, NB built 1880
An annual CSC capital budget of $230 million is profoundly insufficient and completely inad-
equate in light of the large number of much older federal penitentiaries.
This interpretation is implicitly corroborated by PBO in the following chart:
The chart above provides an estimate of the replacement cost of all CSC facilities at $6.5 bil-
lion.  Yet, the PBO chart below documents the absurdly inadequate annual expenditures on 
capital. 
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In other words, past governments and Parliaments refused to adequately capitalize the CSC, 
focusing instead on other issues.  This view was confirmed by the Office of the Auditor Gen-
eral in 2008:
Source: OAG, http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_200812_07_e_31831.html
In other words, issues of economy and efficiency were largely ignored.  Why?  This report sug-
gests that the crime and punishment policy field was appropriated by monopolistic criminolo-
gists in their dominant concern with social justice and criticisms of any person who entered 
the debate who was not a criminologist.  While these strategies erected barriers to entry to the 
policy debate, it led to an impoverished policy debate and inadequately capitalized facilities.
Yet, criminologists are simply not trained in advanced accounting and financial management 
and thus are not qualified to render judgment on the efficacy and efficiency of capital replace-
ment programs.  Instead, professional accountants, economists and analysts of the very high 
caliber in the PBO, and in national accounting firms, project management, construction man-
agement and related professional organizations, must be allowed to participate in the public 
policy debate, without fear of attacks from criminologists.  
CSC focuses much of its effort on safety and security over economy and efficiency.  We found 
little direction from national headquarters to institutions on how to manage their opera-
tions more economically and efficiently.  The mandates of senior management committees 
refer to setting strategic direction and corporate policy and to providing advice, but none of 
them refers to responsibilities for economy and efficiency such as establishing expectations, 
monitoring results, and taking corrective action.  None of the performance information 
currently tracked looks at economy or efficiency of operations.  Further, the requirement to 
manage economically and efficiently is not included in senior management performance.
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It is likely that past governments and parliaments ignored economy and efficiency issues due 
to well justified concerns of virulent criticisms from criminologists in the media, arguing that 
the government is “over-incarcerating” and “corrections budgets are out of control” including 
“unnecessary prison construction”.
It is for these reasons that participation in the public policy crime and punishment debate 
must be expanded to include financial management professionals, professional accountants 
and economists, to ensure plurality and diversity of views rather than homogeneity and con-
formity. In the words of the late Chairman Mao, “let a thousand flowers bloom”.
The chronic under investment in capital replenishment of prison facilities for the past quarter 
century, suggests that the PBO is correct in suggesting that Canadians can anticipate substan-
tial increases in the capital budget for the Correctional Service of Canada, as it finally con-
fronts and starts to replace the aging, and long inadequately capitalized stock of penitentiaries. 
The Government of Canada may wish to examine transferring responsibility for the construc-
tion and capital replenishment of penitentiaries to Public Works and Government Services 
Canada.  
Through our Real Property Branch, PWGSC manages one of the largest and most diverse portfo-
lios of real estate in the country and is the Government of Canada’s real estate expert.
http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/services/bns-prprt-eng.html
This would transfer responsibility to professionals experienced in property management and 
remove this responsibility from the public safety and corrections portfolio (and criminolo-
gists), as they are not trained in property management.
Conclusion
When we step back and examine violent crime statistics since the 1960s, it is clear that the rate 
of violent crime increased by approximately 5 times, per Statistics Canada.
Violent crime per 100,000 increased from 220/100,000 in 1962 to approximately 950/100,000 
by the 1990s.  But this does not capture the distribution of crime in Canada.   Western Can-
ada and the northern territories experience much higher rates of crime, corroborated by the 
Crime Severity Index by CMA, which shows that several cities in western Canada experience 
much higher levels of crime.  Statistics Canada data also reveals that crime falls disproportion-
ately on young people under the age of 30.
Paradoxically, the data reveals that Ontario, including the Greater Toronto Area and Quebec, 
experience lower levels of crime in the Crime Severity Index. 
When we examined the actual numbers of Canadians incarcerated in federal penitentiaries, 
the data revealed that CSC has an average of less than 14,000 offenders.  This is a vanishingly 
small percentage of Canada’s 34 million citizens and empirically contradicts allegations that 
Canada is incarcerating significant numbers of Canadians.  This judgment is confirmed by 
the OECD incarceration data which shows that Canada incarcerates well below similar Eng-
lish speaking, common law countries i.e. USA, UK, Australia and New Zealand.  Moreover, 
Canada’s overall incarceration rate is below the OECD average.  Most importantly, the Cana-
dian federal level of incarceration at 51/100,000 is below every European country including 
Sweden, Finland and Norway
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Critics also allege that Canada’s corrections budget is large and out of control.  Yet, 
when we examine Treasury Board of Canada Main Estimates and the CSC Depart-
mental Performance Report and CSC Report on Plans and Priorities, the data clearly 
and unequivocally reveals that the CSC budget is currently 1% of Government of Can-
ada annual expenditures. 
Moreover, analysis revealed that the CSC capital stock of penitentiaries is aging, as past 
governments and parliaments postponed and deferred capital reinvestment in these 
aging facilities.  It would appear that the government is belatedly addressing these pol-
icy mistakes from the past by reinvesting and increasing the capital budget for prison 
facilities.
In 2011-12, the capital budget is being increased which will increase CSC from 1% to 
1.2% and likely 1.5% in future years, of total annual Government of Canada expendi-
tures.  However, no reasonable person would suggest that 1% or 1.2% or 1.5% consti-
tutes a large and out of control budget. 
The review of the incarceration statistics and the government expenditure data clearly 
reveals that Canada is not incarcerating above the OECD average nor is the federal 
budget spending large amounts of monies on corrections, measured as a percentage of 
annual government expenditures or as a percentage of Canadian GDP.  
This raises questions concerning the criticism of Canada’s corrections policies.   Why 
are critics of Canada’s corrections policies making allegations that are not warranted 
or sustained by the empirical data from highly respected institutions such as Statistics 
Canada, OECD, Treasury Board, Correctional Service of Canada, Public Safety, and 
PBO?
One possible explanation is that professors, federal Members of Parliament and NGO 
leaders occupy a privileged position earning incomes that place them in the top ech-
elon of income in society.  As David Brooks noted in his New York Times columns and 
books (e.g. “Bobos in Paradise: the new upper class and how they got there”) concerning 
the “inter-subjective” consensus of the elites, people of affluence tend to congregate in 
similar affluent, privileged neighbourhoods, which inter alia, experience significantly 
lower levels of violent crime.
The phenomenon being analyzed was captured in a slightly different context by the 
late New York Times film critic, Pauline Kael, who famously said in 1968, “I do not 
know how Richard Nixon was elected because I do not know anyone in Manhattan 
who voted for him”.
Brookian “sociological” analysis of highly educated professionals is a recurrent theme 
in attempts to explain certain fashionable policy views.   In 1970, Tom Wolfe analyzed 
contemporary progressive thinking in his satirization of highly educated professionals 
who express solidarity with violent offenders in “Radical Chic and Mau-mauing the 
flak catchers”, wherein then conductor of the New York Philharmonic, Leonard Ber-
nstein and some friends sponsored a violent offender to a cocktail party on the upper 
west side of Manhattan.  Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.
Restated, affluent, older privileged people in Rockcliffe or the Glebe in Ottawa or the 
Beaches in Toronto or any community with average incomes three or four or five times 
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the Canadian income average, have little existential experience with crime. It is pos-
sibly for this reason that critics characterize Canadians, who express concern or fear of 
violent crime as “perceptions”, notwithstanding that police-reported crimes approxi-
mate 2.5 million annually and this only represents 34% of crimes reported (per Statis-
tics Canada GSS).  In other words, the data strongly suggests that ordinary Canadians 
have a deep existential and very personal understanding of and experience with crime 
in their day to day lives.
In turn, this suggests that governments need to adopt outreach programs to inform 
those privileged Canadians, who perhaps do not understand the lived reality of many 
Canadians, of the data and the relationship between the data, the concerns and fears 
of many Canadians and the public policy initiatives undertaken to address those real 
concerns of ordinary Canadians. 
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Year Population (*000) Violent  Crime Property Crime Other Criminal Code Total Criminal Code
Total Rate
change 









2003 31,629.7 304,515 963 -0.7 1,303,569 4,121 3.7 964,159 3,048 10.3 2,572,243 8,132 5.5
2002 31,361.6 303,946 969 -1.5 1,246,481 3,975 -0.7 867,017 2,765 3.6 2,417,444 7,708 0.7
2001 31,021.3 305,186 984 -0.1 1,241,936 4,004 -1.9 827,689 2,668 2.6 2,374,811 7,655 -0.1
2000 30,689.0 302,098 984 2,7 1,252,387 4,081 -4.6 798,283 2,601 3.3 2,352,768 7,666 -1.1
1999 30,403.9 291,327 958 -2.4 1,299,981 4,276 -6.4 765,523 2,518 -3.5 2,356,831 7,752 -5.0
1998 30,157.1 296,166 982 -1.1 1,377,901 4,569 -6.4 787,089 2,610 0.2 2,461,156 8,161 -3.7
1997 29,907.2 296,890 993 -0.9 1,459,536 4,880 -7.5 778,340 2,603 -2.0 2,534,766 8,475 -5.1
1996 29,610.8 296,746 1,002 -0.7 1,561,811 5,274 -0.3 786,336 2,656 -1.9 2,644,893 8,932 -0.8
1995 29,302.1 295,702 1,009 -3.7 1,550,725 5,292 0.7 793,227 2,707 -4.0 2,639,654 9,008 -1.3
1994 28,999.0 303,745 1,047 -3.2 1,524,519 5,257 -5.7 817,945 2,821 -2.1 2,646,209 9,125 -4.3
1993 28,681.7 310,201 1,082 -0.2 1,599,037 5,575 -5.6 826,388 2,881 -5.6 2,735,626 9,538 -5.0
1992 28,366.7 307,512 1,084 2,3 1,674,773 5,904 -4.2 865,696 3,052 -2.3 2,847,981 10,040 -2.9
1991 28,031.4 296,962 1,059 8.9 1,726,769 6,160 9.8 875,257 3,122 7.7 2,898,988 10,342 9.0
1990 27,697.5 269,503 973 6.8 1,554,348 5,612 6.1 303,342 2,900 7.8 2,627,193 9,485 6.7
1989 27,281.8 248,579 911 5.0 1,443,048 5,289 -2.7 734,309 2,692 3.0 2,425,936 8,892 -0.3
1988 26,795.4 232,606 868 4.7 1,457,361 5,439 -2.0 700,040 2,613 1.5 2,390,007 8,919 -0.4
1987 26,448.9 219,381 829 5.7 1,468,591 5,553 0.1 680,984 2,575 7.6 2,368,956 8,957 2.6
1986 26,101.2 204,917 785 6.9 1,448,550 5,550 1.8 624,282 2,392 7.4 2,277,749 8,727 3.7
1985 25,842.7 189,822 735 4.8 1,408,717 5,451 -0.9 575,636 2,227 1.9 2,174,175 8,413 0.3
1984 25,607.7 179,397 701 3.1 1,408,663 5,501 -1.9 559,597 2,185 0.1 2,147,657 8,387 -1.0
1983 25,367.0 172,315 679 1.2 1,422,703 5,608 -4.0 553,615 2,182 -3.5 2,148,633 8,470 -3.5
1982 25,117.4 168,646 671 2.7 1,466,923 5,840 1.4 568,099 2,262 -2.6 2,203,668 8,773 0.4
1981 24,820.4 162,228 654 2.8 1,429,520 5,759 5.8 576,453 2,322 2.6 2,168,201 8,736 4.7
1980 24,516.1 155,864 636 4.3 1,334,619 5,444 11.0 554,916 2,263 5.1 2,045,399 8,343 8.8
1979 24,201.8 147,528 610 5.1 1,186,697 4,903 7.1 521,046 2,153 7.9 1,855,271 7,666 7.2
1978 23,963.4 138,975 580 1.4 1,097,424 4,579 2.5 478,083 1,995 3.2 1,714,300 7,154 2.6
1977 23,725.9 135,749 572 -2.0 1,059,688 4,466 -1.5 458,587 1,933 3.5 1,654,024 6,971 -0.2
1976 23,450.0 136,935 584 -0.2 1,062,952 4,533 0.8 437,817 1,867 5.6 1,637,704 6,984 1.9
1975 23,143.2 135,424 585 5.9 1,041,036 4,498 8.4 409,345 1,769 5.0 1,585,805 6,852 7.3
1974 22,807.9 126,053 553 5.6 946,793 4,151 12.1 384,039 1,684 8.9 1,456,885 6,388 10.6
1973 22,491.8 117,764 524 5.3 833,148 3,704 1.9 347,643 1,546 26.3 1,298,555 5,773 7.8
1972 22,218.5 110,468 497 1.0 807,468 3,634 -0.4 271,869 1,224 4.6 1,189,805 5,355 0.8
1971 21,962.0 108,095 492 2.4 801,379 3,649 3.8 256,984 1,170 -3.9 1,166,458 5,311 1.9
1970 21,297.0 102,361 481 6.2 748,519 3,515 12.6 259,189 1,217 4.6 1,110,069 5,212 10.0
1969 21,001.0 95,084 453 7.1 655,304 3,120 10.4 244,402 1,164 7.1 994,790 4,737 9.3
1968 20,701.0 87,544 423 11.0 584,996 2,826 13.8 224,990 1,087 10.3 897,530 4,336 12.6
1967 20,378.0 77,614 381 9.9 506,151 2,484 10.0 200,803 985 8.7 784,568 3,850 9.6
1966 20,014.9 69,386 347 15.9 451,980 2,258 8.0 181,443 907 12.0 702,809 3,511 9.8
1965 19,644.0 58,780 299 5.4 410,688 2,091 -2.6 158,950 809 -0.7 628,418 3,199 -1.4
1964 19,291.0 54,769 284 13.8 414,048 2,146 4.9 157,221 815 12.3 626,038 3,245 7.4
1963 18,931.0 47,229 249 13.0 387,517 2,047 8.2 137,359 726 10.1 572,105 3,022 9.0
1962 18,583.0 41,026 221 ... 351,483 1,891 ... 122,477 659 ... 514,986 2,771 ...
Source: http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/Statcan/85-205-XIE/0000385-205-XIE.pdf
Police reported crime, Canada, 1962 - 2003
Permission is given to reproduce the content of this publication on the condition that the author and publisher 
(Macdonald-Laurier Institute) are duly acknowledged. A notice of your intention to use our material would be appreciated.
What people are saying about The Canadian Century, 
the Macdonald-laurier institute’s first book
“As the U.S. and other nations 
struggle to defuse some poten-
tially disastrous fiscal time 
bombs, The Canadian Century 
makes a compelling argument 
that the world should be 
looking to Canada for lessons 
on how to get reform right.” - 
Robert Kelly, Chairman and 
CEO, BNY Mellon 
“The Canadian Century 
reminds us that the temptation 
for governments to solve all our 
problems with higher spending 
always ends in grief—a lesson 
the U.S. will soon learn. It’s a 
reminder that prosperity can 
be ours if we remember Wilfrid 
Laurier’s legacy of liberty, 
lower taxes and smaller gov-
ernment.” - Patrick Luciani, 
author, Economic Myths 
“Crowley, Clemens and Veld-
huis show that if we establish 
a real advantage visà- vis the 
U.S. on tax and other policies, 
that will increase both our 
attraction with emerging pow-
ers and our leverage with the 
US. The question the authors 
pose is whether we have the 
wherewithal to finish the 
job.” - Derek Burney, former 
Canadian Ambassador in 
Washington 
“The authors strike exactly the 
right balance with enough detail 
to keep the most ardent policy 
wonk captivated while writing 
in a breezy style that will engage 
non-economists. And as with a 
good novel, the authors leave us 
in suspense. I urge people to read 
this compelling tale and then, 
like me, anxiously wait for a 
sequel to see how the story ends.” 
- Don Drummond, Senior 
Vice-President and Chief 
Economist, TD Bank Finan-
cial Group 
“Entrepreneurship, hard work 
and self-reliance are deeply 
ingrained in our psyche. Dur-
ing the Redemptive Decade of 
the 1990s these virtues were 
resurrected. In tandem with 
concerted actions by the dif-
ferent levels of government, we 
put right the debt and despair 
created by a couple of dark 
decades when we wobbled 
towards what the Wall Street 
Journal described as Third-
World Status. Limited govern-
ment, light taxes and fiscal 
discipline, argue the authors, 
are the ingredients that bring 
gold in the Olympiad of na-
tions.” - Colin Robertson, 
first Head of the Advocacy 
Secretariat at Canada’s Wash-
ington Embassy 
“This timely and provocative 
book will remind Canadians 
that the smart fiscal and trade 
policies pursued by governments 
of all stripes in the past two de-
cades has made Canada a star 
at the beginning of this century. 
But history should not repeat 
itself. What we have achieved 
recently is what Wilfrid Laurier 
understood to be the right path 
forward for the last century. 
Instead, wars and economic 
depression led to inefficient gov-
ernment spending, high taxes 
and deficits, and protection-
ism. Canada should avoid this 
poisonous policy recipe in the 
coming years to fulfil Laurier’s 
dream of a truly great nation 
of the North, which we should 
rightly be.” - Jack Mintz, 
Palmer Chair in Public Policy, 
University of Calgary 
“This wonderful book is an ur-
gent wake-up call for Canada’s 
current leaders—of all political 
stripes—and raises crucial 
economic issues that should be 
top-of-mind in coming federal 
elections. Now is the time to 
reaffirm the power of Laurier’s 
vision, to make some coura-
geous policy decisions, and to 
thereby ensure that the 21st 
Century belongs to Canada in 
the way Sir Wilfred intended 
a hundred years ago. Will 
Canada’s political leaders pay 
attention?” - Christopher Ra-
gan, Clifford Clark Visiting 
Economist, Finance Canada 
It is not often that Canadi-ans talk about moving out of America’s shadow— for far too long we have simply 
assumed that being in that shadow 
was the natural order of things. 
Crowley, Clemens and Veldhuis 
remind us that Sir Wilfrid Laurier 
thought that all things were pos-
sible for us, and they show, with an 
impressive array of facts to support 
their argument, that Laurier’s plan 
for Canada can still carry us through to that Canadian century we have all been eagerly awaiting for over a hundred years. 
-Allan Gotlieb, from the foreword
